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Anchors Aweigh: 
The Drift toward Crisis in the 1880s 
As we have just seen in the last chapter, the predominant economic problem 
facing Argentina in the decades after independence was sporadic runaway in- 
flation.  Or perhaps, more accurately, we can say that inflation was the most 
serious symptom of deeper institutional and political problems that forestalled 
the creation of a stable macroeconomic regime. 
Frequent bouts of inflation in the Province of Buenos Aires coincided with 
economic crises-commonly  during wars and the fiscal consequences associ- 
ated with sudden bursts of government expenditure. The inflation experience 
was quite similar in other jurisdictions. All provincial governments lacked the 
fiscal tools to perform “tax smoothing.” They had no significant access to inter- 
national bond markets and no capacity to float debt on a domestic bond market. 
They had weak powers of taxation except in trade taxes-the  very source likely 
to fail in times ofwar or crisis.’ Consequently, until alternatives could be found, 
the authorities resorted all too often to the only tax device left:  the inflation 
tax, or seigniorage. 
Of  course, a coordinated solution to these problems was hindered by sectional 
divisions among the provinces. Each province has its own monetary system and 
banking structure, but all suffered from similar difficulties. This epoch has been 
characterized as one in which national money did not exist: 
Each province had its own money, and the same money had a different value between 
one province and another, and even between cities in the same province.  In Buenos 
Aires there were four varieties of paper, as well as foreign coins. In the other provinces, 
Chilean, Bolivian, Peruvian, and other gold, silver, and copper coins circulated side by 
side with provincial paper, with the notes of the Banco Nacional, the notes of private 
bankers, and even of ordinary houses. There was convertible and inconvertible paper. 
Of the silver coins, many were from Chile, Bolivia and Peru; and of these many were 
underweight? 
1. See Arnaral (1988), della Paolera (1988), Cortes Conde (1989), Bordo and Vkgh  (1998),  and 
2. Williams (1920, p.  31). 
Irigoin (1999). 
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The  fledgling banking system had to cope with monetary instability and bank 
failures were common in times of crisis. The  only banks sure to survive were the 
banks owned and operated by the provincial governments. For economic agents 
acting in this environment such volatility confounded any solid expectations of 
stability and any long-term forecasts of prices and economic conditions. The 
various monies in circulation hindered exchange and prevented  the smooth 
operation of domestic commerce within the national free-trade area comprising 
the Province of Buenos Aires and the other provinces that were united in the 
Argentine Confederation.  The payments system and banking channels were 
weak and unreliable in hard times and the circulating paper currency could not 
be counted on as a useful store of value. 
This period has often been referred to as one of “monetary anarchy.”  Yet, 
once the wars subsided, and political union was achieved and consolidated in 
the 1860s and 1870s,  political leaders turned their attention away from matters 
of security, territorial expansion, and internecine conflict. Instead, they began 
to focus on the welfare of the nation state and sought to put Argentina on a 
path toward civilization through modernization, education, economic growth, 
and stability. 
Economic reforms were a key element of this agenda.  If Argentina were 
to modernize it was readily appreciated that a stable economic environment 
would be needed, so as to facilitate the activities of commerce and finance, both 
domestically and with the rest of the world. All sides appreciated the need for 
institutional reforms to achieve that result, and as more and more countries 
in the rest of the world began to adopt metallic standards as their monetary 
system, an obvious path forward seemed to open up. 
A Failed Convertibility Experiment 
In 1862 the recently inaugurated first national administration, led by President 
BartolomC Mitre (1862-68),  began the process of monetary reform when it 
decreed that only paper money issued by the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos 
Aires was to be accepted as legal tender by the Customs Office.  The parity 
was set at 20 paper pesos per peso fuerte, the latter (the “hard peso”) being the 
specie numei-aire of the economy. This was clearly an attempt to force a financial 
innovation to encourage the use of paper money as a means of payment. The 
plan also aspired to increase confidence in the paper money because on the 
foreign exchanges the market rate  at that time stood at 24 paper pesos per 
peso fuerte.  Institutional  innovations would be  needed to make the regime 
more credible in the wake of a period of profligate monetary and fiscal activity. 
The Banco de la Provincia, the single bank of issue, was still under provincial 
jurisdiction and operated under a charter that specified neither a limit on paper 
note issues nor the type of assets to be held against its note issue liabilities. Anchors Aweigh  39 
Thus, to redress the expectations of devaluation in the foreign exchange mar- 
ket was not an easy task. As shown in Table 2.1, paper money had depreciated 
rapidly from 22 paper pesos perpeso  fuerte in 1861 to 29 in 1864. Memories 
of reckless paper printing were fresh. The Banco de la Provincia had expanded 
the quantity of paper money by 88 percent to permit the Province of Buenos 
Aires to finance military expenditures in 1859 and 1861,  notably for the deci- 
sive civil war battles of Cepeda and Pav6n fought against the other provinces 
of the Argentine Confederation.  A commitment was made to buy back the 
notes at the end of the conflict.  Still, once the wars ended, the commitment 
was in doubt when the national administration of the new Argentine Republic 
failed to negotiate with the Province of Buenos Aires a plan to amortize the 
paper notes consistent with the targeted exchange rate of 20 paper pesos per 
peso  fuerte. 
At the national level, the government announced in 1863 that consolidated 
budget deficits would be covered with issues of convertible bonds and presented 
a plan with two alternatives for the future operations of the Banco de la Provin- 
cia. Under Plan A, the state would take over the privilege of issuing paper notes 
from the Banco de la Provincia. Under Plan B, the government would estab- 
lish a regime of competitive banks of issue for issuing bond-backed convertible 
notes? However, neither plan was approved by Congress and so the Banco de 
la Provincia formally retained its independent control of monetary policy.  As 
we shall see, the nation would have to wait thirty years until a crisis led to the 
issue of fiduciary currency being centralized in a decisive reform. 
In the meantime, a piecemeal evolution of the monetary and financial insti- 
tutions was underway.  In 1864 the government agreed with the Banco de la 
Provincia to establish a Conversion Law to take effect on July 1, 1865. This 
deadline was  not met.  It turned out that nobody had thought to figure out 
where to find the real resources needed to fund the necessary specie reserves. 
The starting date for the convertibility plan was put back to 1867. While the 
plan had failed in the short run, it sent a clear signal of the new direction of 
money and banking policy.  In 1864, knowing that it would have to meet the 
eventual limits that would be imposed by the law, the bank began to retire pa- 
per notes.  As Table 2.1 shows, the tightening of credit in the money market 
was dramatic and loans denominated in paper pesos declined by 51 percent in 
the 1864-67 period. The monetary situation reached peak illiquidity in 1865. 
Outstanding credit in paper pesos declined by 27 percent in one year while 
domestic activity, as proxied by the semisum of exports and imports, increased 
by 21 percent. 
The  political economy reaction to the new policywas sharp. The  export sector 
(the ranchers, or hacendados)  argued with the authorities over the inconvenience 
3. See Cortes Conde (1989, p. 31). Table 2.1. RealActivity, Monetary Variables, and Interest Rates, 1861-82 
Banco de la Provincia  Internal 
Exchange  Money  Specie  Money  Deposit Interest Rate  Bond 
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-  1882  25.0  60.4  61.2  __  959  2,065  1,005  .. 
Notes andsources: Exchange rate in paper pesos perpesofuerte.  Exports and imports in millions of gold pesos. Balance sheet data in millions 
of paper pesos.  Interest rates and bond yield in percent.  From Repfiblica Argentina (1916); della Paolera (1983); Cortes Conde (1989). Anchors Aweigh  41 
of a contractionary  monetary policy combined with a floating exchange rate 
regime. At the height of the business cycle they favored a fixed exchange rate 
regime that would stop the appreciation of currency, since specie inflows would 
then have increased the quantity of money. The appreciation of currency was 
strongly correlated with the rise in domestic nominal interest rates as shown in 
Table 2.1.  Even more striking was the fact that the ex post real interest rate 
in the economy skyrocketed: it went from 6 percent in 1864,  to 18  percent in 
1865,  and a high of 29 percent in 1866.4 
The  behavior of real interest rates prompted the government to put an end to 
the appreciation of paper money. By 1867, two new monetary laws had passed. 
First, the Banco de la Provincia was authorized to issue metallic notes up to a 
maximum of 100 million paper pesos? Second, an Office of Exchange (Ojccina 
de  Cambios) was  established on January  3,  1867, within the most important 
official, albeit provincial, bank, the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. 
The new Office of Exchange was intended to be functionally equivalent to the 
Office of Exchange at the Bank of England on which it was modeled. The  Law 
established that the Bank would stand ready to automatically exchange paper 
pesos for hard pesos at a rate of 25 paper pesos per peso$erte. 
What  were the expectations surrounding this new monetary institution? The 
historian  of the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Osvaldo Garrigos, 
writing in 1873, was  quite emphatic when he explained why the Office of 
Exchange, a precursor of the Conversion Office, was established as an entity 
quite separate from the other business areas of the bank 
The name given to the Office of Exchange is due, without doubt, to its function, in- 
dependent from other functions, and hence it stands as a separate division within the 
bank! 
Garrigos and his contemporaries understood very well that the Office of Ex- 
change function dealt with variations in outside money, or the outstanding 
amount of money in circulation in a clean gold standard, and not with inside 
money or secondary money creation: 
The  paper money that the Office of Exchange was putting in circulation, did not multiply 
money, rather it was just a public signaling of exchange. The issue was limited and had 
as backing an equal amount of gold.’ 
The question still remained whether this clean separation of the inside and 
outside money functions would be  respected, a question that would pervade 
4.  The ex post real interest rate was calculated using the exchange rate as a proxy for domestic 
prices. This approach assumes purchasing  power parity and stable world prices, both reasonable 
assumptions. See della Paolera (1983). 
5. Specie reserves backing the so-called  metallic notes were set at  33 percent  of outstanding 
circulation. See CortOs Conde (1989, p.  50). 
6. Own translation from Garrigos (1873, p.  147). 
7.  Own translation from Garrigos (1873, p.  148). 42  Straining at  the  Anchor 
Argentine monetary history from that day forward.  As we shall see next, the 
Office of Exchange’s automatic mechanism functioned well in the first four to 
five years after its inception; but thereafter the Banco de la Provincia was “used” 
in a discretionary way by Sarmiento.  The mechanical rules were no longer 
respected, and it evolved into what we might call a managed gold exchange 
standard. 
To sum up the 1860s experience, we can ask how well did the disorganized 
regime function? The period from 1862 to 1868 can be divided in two subpe- 
riods: 1862-64, a period dominated by inflationary expectations; and 1865-68, 
a period characterized by the revaluation of paper money and an increase in 
nominal and real interest rates. This set the stage for a stable period from 1867 
to 1876 when Argentina formally adhered to the international gold standard. 
The years of President Doming0 Sarmiento’s term in office (1868-74)  can 
certainly be characterized as an era of prosperity and economic stability. From 
1868  to 1872,  exports and imports increased on average by more than 50 percent. 
Aggregate demand was  also expanding, mainly driven by public investments 
at the federal level:  the cumulative deficit of the national administration for 
1868-72  amounted to 2.5 times fiscal receipts.’  Deficits were covered with 
external loans and bank advances.  Interestingly enough, public expenditures 
seemed to have had no sizeable contemporaneous crowding-out effects. Yields 
on financial assets were steadily declining throughout the convertibility period. 
From an average level of 15 percent in 1866, domestic interest rates fell to 7.5 
percent in 1872, a sign of loosening monetary policy.  In 1871, commercial 
paper rates and yields on public bonds had started to converge toward levels 
observed in the US. ec~nomy.~ 
The adjustment was  a corollary of the large role of capital imports in the 
economy, stimulated in part by the convertibility regime.  Sizeable balance of 
payments surpluses increased the stock of money in the economy and, in turn, 
this reinforced the downward pressure on domestic interest rates. From 1868 
to 1872 the monetary base increased at an average annual rate of 16 percent. 
The large increase in the demand for money was also met with an expansion 
of banking money at an average annual rate of almost 20 percent in the same 
period; clearly the broad money supply expansion was not solely the result of 
the automatic gold-standard mechanism. 
Using conventional accounting procedures to perform  a decomposition of 
the sources of money growth, one can infer that 68 percent of the increase 
in the money base was explained by gold inflows to the Office of Exchange. 
8. The deficit is  measured as fiscal receipts minus total outlays of the public sector, a concept 
termed uso ddcredifo. Data from Cortts Conde (1989, p. 86). 
9. The table shows the commercial deposit rate was 6 percent in 1872; call money rates (lending 
rates) in the United States stood at 8 percent in the same year.  See Friedman and Schwartz 
(1982, p.  122). Anchors Aweigh  43 
Bank issues of metalhc notes explained only 17  percent of the growth in the 
monetary base. While this expansionary of the fiduciary issue was not quanti- 
tatively important in 1872,  it reflected a fundamental weakness in the monetary 
and banking institutional arrangements and showed that, on the margin, the 
monetary base was not fully backed as in a strict gold standard. 
In this sense Argentina was on a “managed gold standard regime, with both 
rules and discretion in play.  The Banco de la  Provincia could manage two 
instruments of monetary policy.’O  First, the reserve-deposit ratio, a means to 
control the elastic relationship between inside and outside money  Second, the 
supply of fractionally backed metallic notes, the elastic supply of outside money 
itself. The  potential for conflict and collapse arose from this ill-designed system. 
Recall that there was still no national currency per se. The notes of the Banco 
de la Provincia were supposed to be the de facto convertible currency of the 
country, but this reputation rested on the additional presence of the Office of 
Exchange and its commitment to the international monetary standard. 
Thus, the degree of discretion in one element of the system could pollute the 
clean, rule-based structures put in place elsewhere. This very primitive example 
of inconsistent policies in the Argentine case will set the tone for much of the 
history we discuss in the rest of the book; it was  a case, so to speak, of bad 
monetary institutions driving out good. 
During the 1868-72 period of economic expansion and capital inflows the 
level of specie reserves and the money supply moved together, and expanding 
credit fed into an already liquid money market. Adverse domestic and interna- 
tional conditions took hold in 1873. The  government reacted to the contraction 
in the gold-backed money supply by expanding the stock of metallic notes, that 
is, by pursuing a policy of sterilization. 
It  was hoped that the expansionary monetary policy would not just prevent 
a fall in the domestic money stock but also replenish the exhausted banking 
reserves of the Banco de la Provincia. At the start of the monetary crisis the 
bank tried to decrease its level of reserves, but the external drain quickly became 
an internal drain as depositors tested the convertibility of deposits into cash. 
This is shown clearly in Table 2.1. The reserve-deposit ratio declined from 20 
percent in 1872 to 3 percent in 1876.  Only the issue of more metallic notes 
prevented the Banco de la Provincia from collapsing. 
Predictably,  the attempt to sterilize the negative effects of gold outflows failed 
and convertibility was abandoned in May 1876, with the state of suspension 
being known by the curious term curso  furzoso.  Figure 2.1 describes extremely 
well some of the dynamics of this period.  In particular, under a credible con- 
vertible regime with a fixed exchange rate there was a fall in nominal interest 
10. There  were other small banks, including the newly founded Banco Nacional,  hut they amounted 
to less than 10 percent of the banking system. Hence, we focus our attention in this section 
solely on the Banco de la Provincia. 44  Straining  at  the  Anchor 
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Notes andsources:  See Table 2.1. 
rates coupled with a rise in the real level of monetization of the economy (the 
period 1868-72).  Subsequently, the process of monetization was halted when 
the economy was overheated by an expansionary fiscal policy that was incon- 
sistent with the convertible regime (the period 1873-76). This latter episode is 
characterized by a decline in real cash balances as agents converted money to 
specie, ending in a final speculative attack a la Krugman and a collapse of the 
fixed exchange rate.” 
The incoming administration  of President Nicolas Avellaneda (1  874-80) 
thus had to cope with a depreciating currency, capital outflows, and a precar- 
ious budgetary  situation.”  The real sector of the economy adjusted almost 
instantaneously to the credit-rationing  situation. Trade deficits were reversed 
and sizeable surpluses emerged to cope with the burden of external debt service. 
The adjustment was promoted by the implementation of restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policies: public expenditures were reduced by 40 percent in real terms 
in 1877,  the money base remained fixed, and the nominal exchange rate appre- 
ciated to its earlier level of 25 paper pesos per peso  fuerte.  The new economic 
equilibrium prepared the way for a fresh monetary experiment and yet another 
attempt to get the monetary and financial institutions right. 
11. Krugrnan (1979). 
12. In 1876, the budget deficit was 93 percent of fiscal receipts (Cartes Conde 1989, p. 112). Cartoon 2.1. i.16 de Mayo 1876!  EL  cuadro consolador de  nuesfra3Liz sifuaiidn.  (The comforting 
picture of our happy situation.) 
Notes: The  cartoon conveys the idea that the 1876 suspension of convertibility called iurzo  forzoso 
(written on the guillotine) is in breach of the constitution (the already decapitated body on the 
scaffold). At  left, President Nicolas Avellaneda, the executioner, holds the head of the constitution. 
Agio (written on the blade) is the gold premium, or, equivalently, the devaluation relative to par. 
Under the platform a group of masked men fill up their bags with gold. At the top of the steps, 
the priest administering  the last rites to the next victim, public credit, is Finance Minister Santiago 
CortinCz. 
Source: Elmosyuito, no. 698, May 21, 1876. 46  Straining at the Anchor 
Another False Start 
We now turn to the 1880s and 1890s, focusing on institutional developments in 
the realms of money and banking that contributed to a major macroeconomic 
crisis and its eventual resolution.  Serious legislative efforts to devise a new 
monetary system began in 1878.  Congress  debated the establishment  of a 
national monetary system that would put an end to the period of monetary 
anarchy. Plans were drawn up and finally, in 1881,  Congress voted for a currency 
reform law. 
The  Monetary Law of November 5,1881,was intended to put Argentina on 
a new kind of monetary regime, a bimetallic standard. It  was decreed that units 
of gold and silver pesos would exchange with new paper peso notes at given par 
values, and fixed exchange rates against key international currencies would thus 
be estab1i~hed.I~  In addition to establishing the units of the currency, the law 
stipulated that, after eight million gold pesos and four million silver pesos were 
coined, the use of foreign metallic coins as legal tender was to be prohibited. 
Only national minted coins and “accepted national money” could serve as legal 
tender for all debts, private and public. A mint was to be created and foreign 
metallic coins were to be accepted at their bullion value in exchange for gold 
and silver pesos.14 
The transition  to this new regime was  not smooth, however, and the law 
supplied few details as to the implementation of the plan.  The problem was 
how to replace the stock of old paper notes in circulation, 882 million incon- 
vertible paper pesos, for new paper notes exchangeable at par with the gold 
peso. In 1881, the vestigial notes represented 73 percent of the total currency in 
circulation. The  law only indicated an accounting device: banks of issue were 
required, within two years, to replace their paper notes with the new monetary 
unit based on the prevailing market rate of exchange between old paper pesos 
and the new gold peso. 
Another provision of the law sharply curtailed “wildcat banking” tendencies 
by  limiting the capacity for monetary expansion in the banking system as  a 
whole. In a drastic change, the privilege of issuing the new notes was restricted 
to  just five banks. Four of these were publicly owned (state and provincial)  banks: 
Banco Nacional; Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires; Banco Provincial de 
Santa F6; and Banco Provincial de C6rdoba. The fifth was Otero &  Co., the 
only private bank accorded the privilege.” 
13. The monetary units were to be the gold peso, of 24.89 grains, 9/10 fine, and the silver peso, 
of 385.8 grains, 9/10 fine (Article 1).  At these definitions of content, the legal ratio of gold to 
silver was 15.5 and the following parity rates were established with the key currencies of the 
major countries on the gold standard:  one British pound = 5.04 gold pesos, one U.S. dollar = 
1.04 gold pesos, and 5 French francs = 1  gold peso. 
14. See Article 5.  Agote (1882, p.  212) estimated that, by  the end of 1881, foreign metallic 
currencies represented 27 percent of total currency in circulation including paper notes. 
15. Williams (1920, p.  35). Anchors Aweigh  47 
Absent direct government control of the money supply, the behavior of the 
banks of issue would determine the viability of the new regime. Could they be 
relied upon to adhere to sound practices and so maintain convertibility of the 
notes they issued into specie? There was the usual problem that banks have 
little incentive to maintain non-interest-bearing  reserves above the required 
level.  Specie was not to be solely confined to use as backing for paper note 
issues. Since national minted coins were to be legal tender, banks could choose 
to make loans and discounts in metallic coins as long as they did not violate the 
monetary reserve requirements. 
In short, specie holdings were to have a double purpose: first, as an asset held 
to ensure convertibility and, second, as an asset held to meet liabilities payable 
in specie; thus, profit maximization would lead banks to make the reserve re- 
quirements a binding constraint most of the time.  In a crucial omission, the 
new law was silent with respect to the specie reserves that banks would have 
to hold  to back their paper note issues.  Thus, the only rules regulating the 
relationship between paper notes and specie would be the self-imposed rules 
laid down in the respective charters of the banks themselves. 
These rules varied considerably from case to case. For example,  under its 1872 
charter, the issue of convertible notes by the Banco Nacional could not exceed 
200 percent of bank capital, and the bank had to maintain a specie reserve of 
25 percent of all notes issued. The  original charter of the Banco de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires was much more lax:  it specified neither a limit on note issue 
nor the assets to be held as reserves. This lack of regulation was soon rectified, 
and in March 1883 the Board of Directors passed a special motion stating that 
“the specie held by the bank will be increased to a minimum of a third of the 
circulating bank notes.”  At the Banco Provincial de Cordoba specie reserves 
were to be 45 percent of the note issues. The  Banco Provincial de Santa Fe was 
subject to a more vague requirement that “the bank could increase its emission 
in proportion to its capital and resources.’’16 Were these reserve requirements 
sufficiently strict? By international comparative standards of prudent banking 
regulation, we think not: note issues certainly did not require anything like the 
100 percent marginal bullion reserve as under the British specie standard. 
The law went into effect in July 1883. From that time Argentina operated 
under a mixed specie and fiduciary standard where the paper peso exchanged 
at par with the gold peso. Yet the system was unlike many metallic standards in 
that it was still very decentralized. No national monetary authority existed and 
all control over the convertibility of notes rested with the five banks of issue. 
The period of convertibility lasted only seventeen months.  From late De- 
cember 1884  the banks of issue refused to exchange gold at par for notes. The  de 
facto suspension of convertibility was soon accommodated by the government, 
16. Agote (1887, pp. 212-15,218-25);  Pifieiro (1921, p. 247); Cuccorese (1972, p. 297). 48  Straining at the Anchor 
since, having no institutional power over the monetary system, there was little 
they could do to prevent it.  In March 1885,  the federal Government decreed 
curso  forzoso again, that is, the inconvertibility into gold of paper money, with a 
promise that convertibility would be restored in December 1886. 
Lacking any direct control over the monetary system, the government could 
do little more than resort to moral suasion. Banks were exhorted “to discount 
in gold, to take exchange with gold, or to carry out any other legal operation 
intended to raise the value of the currency and devoting new elements to com- 
merce and to the industries.””  But there was no direct intervention, and no 
steps were taken to repair whatever it was that had ailed the banks and left their 
balance sheets so fragile that they had been forced to suspend in the first place. 
The  strategy of the government was one of hoping and waiting, trusting that an 
upswing in economic conditions might boost the health of the banks enough 
to permit a resumption of convertibility. 
As one might have guessed, resumption was never achieved. When Decem- 
ber 1886 arrived, convertibility was suspended indefinitely.  What happened 
afterward is succinctly captured by Figure 2.2. From 1884  to 1899,  the Argen- 
tine monetary regime was a de facto paper standard in which the paper peso 
floated against gold, and hence against the key currencies. The gold premium 
remained fairly stable in the first two years that followed the suspension of con- 
vertibility but, thereafter, it skyrocketed until 1891. Moreover, as one would 
expect in a small open economy feeling a powerful influence of purchasing- 
power parity, the price level moved in tandem with the exchange rate. 
Toward a Working Currency Board 
A major theme of this book is to show how the record of monetary instability 
prior to 1890 played a critical role in shaping the design of new institutions. 
A cursory outline of these events will set the stage for what follows.  The 
opportunity for redesign came after a peculiar banking experiment, which is 
discussed in the next section, gave way to a financial crash and a major recession 
in 1890-91, the Baring Crisis, which is discussed at greater length in the next 
chapter. Argentine economic policymaking was to live in the shadow of these 
events for decades to come. 
Following the Baring Crisis, the government sought to cast off, once and 
for all, the monetary anarchy of the nineteenth century by tying its hands as 
firmly as possible. Adopting a rigid commitment device-that  is, a “hard”  gold 
standard rule-the  government stuck to a strict disinflation policy in the 1890s 
in an attempt to reestablish the gold standard at the old parity. In November 
17. Agote (1887, p.  627). Anchors Aweigh  49 
Figure 2.2. Prices and the Paper-Gold Exchange Rate, 1884-1914 
4, 
-Price  Level (1884~1)  -  Exchange Rate (Paper Pesos per Gold Peso) 
0 
1884  1889  1894  1899  1904  1909  1914 
Notes andsources: See Appendix 1. 
1891  Congress approved the October 1890 Conversion Office law proposed by 
the Executive. 
The  centerpiece of the law was a new national monetary authority, one under 
direct government control. This was to be called the Conversion Office (Caja 
de Conwrsidn). It  would have the sole right to engage in note issues, a privilege 
that was to be withdrawn from the banks following their dismal record of 
irresponsible note issues that had left a trail of increasingly worthless paper in 
economy and established a pattern of chronic inflation. The  Conversion Office 
was to function as a currency board, or redemption bureau, modeled after the 
issue department of the Bank of England.  It would simply and mechanically 
exchange national paper notes for gold, or vice versa, on demand, and at a fixed 
exchange rate. 
As is apparent from Figure 2.2, deflation took place until 1899, though it 
was insufficient to force prices and exchange rates back to their levels under 
the old parity.  That being so, resumption was going to require some form of 
devaluation.  After long and protracted arguments-to  which we shall return 
in due course-the  exchange rate was fixed at 2.27 paper pesos per gold peso. 
That rate, being the market rate, meant that Argentina, instead of debasing 
the gold peso created in 1881, opted to devalue the paper currency as a way to 
achieve convertibility. Under this new regime, convertibility was successfully 50  Straining  at the  Anchor 
maintained until the outbreak of the First World War, and the currency board 
itself operated until the 1930s. 
To summarize, the institutional developments in the Argentine monetary 
system from the 1880s until 1913 can be briefly restated.'*  Argentina legally 
adopted gold and silver as the basis for its monetary system in 1881,  and oper- 
ationally in 1883. This metallic standard, in which specie coins would circulate 
side-by-side with paper notes, soon failed in 1884.  An inflationary boom- 
and-bust cycle ensued.  Following the crisis, in 1891 a completely new design 
brought the monetary system under the central control of a currency board. 
After a period of inconvertibility, in 1899 Argentina reentered the gold stan- 
dard system, but under a regime very different from, and more robust than, the 
initial bimetallic standard envisaged in 1881. 
Money, Banks, and Currency Substitution 
Having surveyed the major institutional developments at the level of the mon- 
etary regime, we now seek to appraise how changes in institutional structure 
affected the expectations of economic agents. A useful way to attack this ques- 
tion is to assess the role and use of specie by the public. 
The  willingness of the public to hold notes rests on their confidence in con- 
vertibility. If the public ever suspects that convertibility will be suspended, or 
that their holdings of paper might be susceptible to devaluation, then banks 
might face a sudden run on gold reserves as agents seek to convert paper into 
specie. Such runs could cause bank failure if the reserves are insufficient to cover 
deposits. If a crisis looms, a government then faces the question ofwhat it will 
(or can) do about it. After such crises, and even if banks resume convertibility, 
cautious agents may stii  prefer to hold the cumbersome metal rather than paper 
notes for fear that the same might happen again. 
At the start of our period there are few quantitative measures of public hold- 
ings of gold and silver.  However, contemporary scholars did report that gold 
and silver coins were never widely used in domestic monetary transactions: 
specie in hands of the public in 1881  was estimated to be 3 million gold pesos. 
Such a figure would correspond to about 5 percent of the total currency in cir- 
culation in that year (defined as the sum of paper notes and metallic coins).19 
Moreover, within a short span of time silver ceased to play an active monetary 
role.  It seems that the mint ratio was  set at a level that drove silver out of 
circulation given the (world) market price for silver, a classic case of Gresham's 
18. For more details, the reader may refer back to Table 1.2. 
19. Agote (1882, p. 211) estimated the currency in circulation at the end of 1881 at 56.1 million 
gold pesos; of this, fiduciary notes represented 41 million, specie in banks 12.1 million, and 
public holdings 3 million. Anchors Aweigh  51 
Cartoon 2.2. Los unos chupan con una gana  asombrosa, los otros se chupan los dedos,  mientrac tanfo, 
nuesfrapobre  Republica, que es la que ceba elmafe, epra  pue los chupadores se recuerden que ella esta muy 
enferma  y espera elcuidado  y el ayudo de todos. (Some of them are sucking with great pleasure, others 
are sucking their fingers, while in the meantime our poor Republic, who made the mate, is waiting 
for the suckers to remember that she is very sick and needs the help of all of them.) 
Notes: The  mate is a traditional drinkofArgentina brewed from hot  water and herbs (yerba), and the 
term also refers to the bowl from which it is drunk through straws. This mate is labeledprosupuesto 
(budget), a reference to the politicians' ability to drain the public coffers. Sucking at the mate are 
many politicians, including (front row, left to right) President Nicolis Avellaneda, former President 
Doming0 Sarmiento, Finance Minister Santiago Cortintz, and former governor of the Province 
of Buenos Aires Adolfo Alsina.  All  those inside the stockade are of the same political party, the 
PAN (Parfido  Aufonomista Naciona(). Outside the gate, stands former President Bartolomi Mitre 
and his rival faction who were opposed to the PAN,  behind the sign that says esprohibida la entrada 
a (us Mitristas (no entry to Mitristas). Someone is forcing through the fence a saw that bears the 
name liberfad (liberty). Meanwhile, an Indian rides by in the background. 
Source: El mosquito,  no. 682, January 30,1876. 
Law at work.  Argentina was soon a de jure bimetallic country, but a de facto 
monometalk country, as was typically the case?' 
Subsequently, net flows of silver with the rest of the world were insignificant; 
hence, silver coins may safely be excluded from the definition of the Argentine 
currency stock for the period under study?' By contrast, bank notes were issued 
in smaller denominations.z2  Therefore, it appears that even the five gold peso 
coin was inferior to the five gold peso note for transaction purposes. 
What happened next?  For the period  after the demise of the bimetallic 
20. From 1881 to 1884, silver coins worth 2.8 million gold pesos were minted. During the same 
period the outflow of silver was equal to 2.8 million gold pesos (Lorini 1902, p.  366). 
21. For 1886-99  the cumulative net import of silver from the rest of the world amounted to 0.3 
million gold pesos. 
22. For example, at the most important hank of issue, the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Ares, 
metallic notes up to five gold pesos were issued in eight small denominations: 8, 10, 16, 20, 
and 40 cents; and 1,2, and 4  pesos.  Cuccorese (1972, p.  283). 52  Straining at the  Anchor 
standard, recent scholarship takes the view that specie in circulation was still 
insignificant relative to the currency stock, and stayed that way.  For example, 
Ford stated that “by 1896 when the coinage of gold ceased, gold coins to the 
value of 31.7 million gold pesos had been issued (nearly four times the original 
issue planned), yet in 1896 no gold coins circulated, any more than they did 
in 1881.”23  However, we are not satisfied with such an incomplete account. 
Ford does not explicitly report the evidence on which his assertion is based. 
Moreover, as we show below, the use of specie as a means of payment does not 
tell the relevant story for the interim years during the crisis. 
To assess  specie holding by the public we  have to distinguish  the use of 
specie as  a means ofpayment and its use as  a store of  value.  First, the fact 
that the authorities discontinued minting of coins would not have precluded 
domestic residents from holding specie (just as, today, the fact that the Argentine 
government is not empowered to issue U.S. dollars does not preclude residents 
from holding and hoarding U.S. dollars in significant amounts). Second, even 
if gold did not circulate as a generalized means of payment, one should not leap 
to the conclusion that its role as a store of value was insignificant. 
To try to resolve the question, we now present new estimates for the specie 
in hands of the public for the period  1884-1914.24  The data for  1883-99 
are displayed in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3.  The evidence suggests that public 
hoarding was  due to the failure of the monetary regime.  In every year from 
1884until  the financial crash of 1891  we can see that the public, as asset holders, 
attempted to restore their portfolio balance in the face of expected paper money 
depreciation, demanding gold as hedge against inflation.  This trend became 
especially prominent after 1888. 
An important issue here is  that if people attempt to flee from the paper 
peso and into gold, and the monetary authorities do not precommit to fix the 
paper-gold exchange rate, then, under the assumption that the stock of gold is 
reasonably steady, one should expect the gold premium to rise. That the public 
distrusted the regime may seem all the more surprising given the spectacular 
economic boom that took place in the late 1880s, but subsequent events were 
to confirm the public’s suspicions that a crisis was at hand. 
23. Ford (1962, p. 93). 
24. The method used is very simple.  Briefly put, at each moment in time there is a given stock 
of specie in the country. Because Argentina is not a specie producer, this stock of specie gets 
increased or decreased by the net flows of specie from abroad. Hence, with data for specie flows 
and an initial stock of specie for the year  1883, we can generate a time series on the stock of 
specie for the remaining years.  The specie stock may be held by  three categories of holders: 
the monetary authorities, the banks, and the public. Elsewhere, we can obtain the holdings of 
specie by the domestic financial system including monetary authorities,  and then, as a residual, 
we obtain public hoarding of specie. Anchors Aweigh  53 
Table 2.2. Argentine Specie Stock, 1883-99 
Initial  Net  Terminal  Specie  Public 
Specie  Specie  Specie  Held by  Hoarding 
Year  Stock  Flow  Stock  Banks  of Specie 
1883  -  -  22.5  19.5  3.0 
1884  22.5  0.4  22.9  20.7  2.2 
1885  22.9  -2.1  20.8  17.4  3.4 
1886  20.8  12.3  33.1  26.5  6.6 
1887  33.1  -0.1  33.0  21.9  11.1 
1888  33.0  36.1  69.1  52.7  16.4 
1889  69.1  -16.7  52.4  22.0  30.4 
1890  52.4  1.9  54.3  10.0  44.3 
1891  54.3  7.5  61.8  7.9  53.9 
1892  61.8  4.5  66.3  9.1  57.2 
1893  66.3  3.7  70.0  11.8  58.2 
1894  70.0  2.9  72.9  10.7  62.2 
1895  72.9  4.6  77.5  13.0  64.5 
1896  77.5  3.9  81.4  12.9  68.5 
1897  81.4  -4.3  77.1  12.3  64.8 
1898  77.1  5.7  82.8  13.4  69.4 
1899  82.8  1.7  84.5  18.4  66.1 
Notes andsources; Units are millions of gold pesos on December 31. See Appendix 1. 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Inconsistencies 
To  better understand the public’s reaction we must step back and survey the 
broader macroeconomic picture of Argentina in the 1880s and the rising role 
of international finance. 
Even as the first attempts to reform the monetary  system ran  into diffi- 
culties, the new spirit of modernization  in the country had been noted on a 
global level. Foreign investors were alert to the untapped potential of a rapidly 
growing economy with abundant land, an open frontier for expansion, and a 
seemingly more stable macroeconomic environment.  Growth and investment 
surged in the boom years  of 1884-90,  a period that Williams called one of 
“heavy borrowing” with massive capital inflows from abroad: 
The borrowing was maintained throughout the eighties, culminating in loans of such 
extent as have probably never been equaled, by a country of so small a population as was 
that of Argentina?’ 
Argentina’s rise to prominence in the London capital market was impressive. 
In these years the country absorbed 11 percent of the new portfolio issues of 
the London market; North America, with a population twenty times that of 
Argentina, absorbed only 30 percent of London’s new issuesF6 
25. Williams (1920, p.  3). 
26. London issues for Argentina from Ford (1962, p.  148); total London issues from Simon (1968, 
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To put it differently, a very rough estimate is that the current account deficit 
of Argentina averaged 20percent of gross domestic product (GDP)  in the years 
1884-89, before collapsing to almost zero in 1890 itselfas the crisis hit. This is a 
phenomenal ratio, the like ofwhich has probably not been seen in any emerging 
market boom before or since?’  Most of the foreign capital inflow was used to 
finance works associated with shifts in the composition of production  of the 
newly settled country. The bulk of the investment went to the construction of 
social overhead projects, the improvement of cultivable  lands, and the expansion 
of the railroad network. 
When, by the middle of the eighties, European investors had become espe- 
cially enamored with Argentina as a target for foreign investment, federal and 
provincial governments seized the opportunity, capitalizing on the momentum 
to borrow for fiscal purposes.  During the boom period, the federal adminis- 
tration augmented the level of public indebtedness relative to real output from 
a ratio of 64 percent in 1884 to 101 percent in 1890.28  The ease with which 
Argentina could obtain loans from the London capital markets had important 
consequences for fiscal debt management: the ability to float government bonds 
externally began to significantly augment the other, relatively restricted, sources 
of fiscal revenue, namely foreign trade taxes and inflationary finance. 
At the beginning of the boom period one of the aims of fiscal policy was the 
resumption of the specie standard.  Resumption was seen as a necessary step 
to encourage the inflow of private capital from abroad by reducing exchange- 
rate uncertainty. From Tables 2.3 and 2.4 one is tempted to conclude that the 
(unfulfilled) precommitment of the monetary authorities to return to parity had 
a positive impact in several aspects. 
Banks increased their level of reserves in the short run prior to the promised 
resumption of convertibility.  From Table 2.4, we see that for 1884-87  the 
reserve-ratio contributed negatively to the growth in money supply. That is, 
banks were replenishing their vaults after the convertibility crisis of December 
1884. Despite the demise of the specie standard, the level of specie hoarding by 
the public stayed low, at around 5 percent of the monetary base or 2.5 percent 
of the total money stock. In addition, the economy benefited as domestically 
created inflation was attenuated by the worldwide deflation trend?9 
27. Taylor (1998). 
28. The  level of public debt is defined as the stock of outstanding funded debt in pesos and hard 
currency. For 1884 it amounted to 198 million gold dollars or 3,218 million 1950 pesos.  Real 
output was estimated at 4,992 million 1950 pesos. For 1890 funded debt was 361 million gold 
dollars or 7,398 million 1950 pesos; real output was 7,348 million 1950  pesos. Figures for debt 
are revised estimates from Memorias de  Hacienda and Vazquez-Presedo (1971, p.  93).  Real 
output from Appendix 1. 
29. We performed  a conventional test of purchasing-power parity on the levels and on the first 
differences of domestic and foreign common-currency prices for the period 1884-1913,  and 
subperiods 1884-99  and 1900-1913.  In each case the slope coefficients of the foreign price 
level were not statistically different from one. The  formal results are presented in Appendix 4. Table 2.3. Statistical Summary, 1884-1 913 
Period  188487 1887-89  1884-89  1890  1891 1892-99  188499 1892-13  190G13 1884-13 
Number of Years in the Period  3  2  5  1  1  7  15  21  13  29 
A. Percentage Change in: 
(1) Money Stock  47.3  58.2  105.5  11.1  -25.8  18.0  101.2  146.4  124.5  229.6 
(2) Monetary Base  53.0  25.5  78.5  40.4  6.4  3.4  136.1  107.2  102.6  239.9 
(3) Banking Money  42.7  80.2  122.9  -8.1  -63.9  48.9  60.6  208.8  151.7  220.6 
(4) Real Output  17.2  25.3  42.5  -4.5  -11.7  30.6  65.5  109.0  80.8  143.9 
(5) Prices  19.7  18.4  38.1  33.9  44.5  -22.3  71.5  14.0  24.3  107.8 
(6)  Exchange Rate  30.0  28.8  58.8  36.0  37.1  -38.0  81.1  -37.1  -1.7  82.0 
(7) U.K. Prices  -14.4  4.6  -9.8  -0.1  3.4  -9.2  -21.3  14.2  15.3  2.1 
B. Percentage Change Per Year in: 
(8) Money Stock 
(9) Monetary Base 
(10) Banking Money 
(11)  Real Output 
(12) Prices 
(13) Exchange Rate 
15.8  29.1  21.1  11.1  -25.8  2.6  6.7  7.0  9.6  7.9 
17.7  12.8  15.7  40.4  6.4  0.5  9.1  5.1  7.9  8.3 
14.2  40.1  24.6  -8.1  -63.9  7.0  4.0  9.9  11.7  7.6 
5.7  12.7  8.5  -4.5  -11.7  4.4  4.4  5.2  6.2  5.0 
6.6  9.2  7.6  33.9  44.5  -3.2  4.8  0.7  1.9  3.7 
10.0  14.4  11.8  36.0  37.1  -5.4  5.4  -1.8  -0.1  2.8  - 
(14) U.K. Prices  -4.8  2.3  -2.0  -0.1  3.4  -1.3  -1.4  0.7  1.2  0.1 
C. Average Level OJ? 
(15) Multiplier  2.1  2.6  2.4  2.2  1.6  1.5  1.9  1.7  1.9  1.9 
(16) Income Velocity  1.8  1.5  1.6  1.7  3.1  2.8  2.3  2.5  2.3  2.3 
(17) Gold StocWBase (%)  26.0  37.0  32.0  22.0  24.0  26.0  28.0  35.0  40.0  33.3 
(18) Hoarding5ase (%)  5.0  13.7  8.6  18.0  20.0  22.0  16.6  16.4  13.3  15.0 
(19) Nonperforming Assets/Loans (%)  6.8  5.6  6.2  19.5  21.0  1.5  -  1.3  1.2  - 
Notes and sources: See Appendix 1. Table 2.4. Money Supply, 1884-1913 
Period  1884-87  1887-89  1884-89  1890  1891 1892-99  1884-99  1892-13  1900-13  1884-13 
A.  Money Stock Change (%)  47.3  58.2  105.5  11.1  -25.8  18.0  101.2  146.4  124.5  229.6 
B.  Proximate Determinants ofthe Change in the Money Stock: 
(1)  Monetary Base  53.0  25.5  78.5  40.4  6.4  3.4  136.1  107.2  102.6  239.9 
(2) Currency Ratio  1.2  6.4  8.4  -31.9  -32.2  10.4  -18.5  18.6  11.6  -0.3 
(3) Reserve Ratio  -6.9  20.3  14.4  -2.6  -8.0  2.4  -27.4  9.3  6.9  -10.6 
(4) Interaction of  Ratios  0.0  6.0  4.2  5.2  8.0  1.8  11.0  11.3  3.4  0.6 
C.  Fraction of  Change in Money Stock Attributable to Chaqe  in: 
(5) Monetary Base  1.12  0.44  0.74  3.64  -0.25  0.19  1.34  0.73  0.82  1.04 
(6) Currency Ratio  0.02  0.11  0.08  -2.87  1.25  0.58  -0.18  0.13  0.09  0.00 
(7) Reserve Ratio  -0.16  0.35  0.14  -0.23  0.31  0.13  -0.27  0.06  0.06  -0.05 
(8) Interaction of Ratios  0.00  0.10  0.04  0.47  -0.31  0.10  0.11  0.08  0.03  0.01 
D. Fraction .$Change  in Money Stock Consisting  of  a Change in: 
(9) Monetary Base  0.51  0.17  0.28  1.44  -0.13  0.13  0.73  0.42  0.44  0.50 
(10) BankCreatedMoney  0.49  0.83  0.72  -0.44  1.13  0.87  0.27  0.58  0.56  0.50 
0.00  -  (11)  Domestic Credit  0.84  1.62  1.15  1.08  1.00  1.00  -  - 
1.00  -  (12) Monetary Specie  0.16  -0.62  -0.15  -0.08  0.00  0.00  -  - 
E. Fraction of  Change in Monetary Base Consisting  of  Change in: 
Notes andsources: See Appendix 1. 58  Straining at  the Anchor 
The macroeconomic situation so far appeared to be manageable, but in 1887 
the financial scenario drastically changed for the worse after the government 
launched a new monetary experiment, the Law of National Guaranteed Banks. 
The  framers of the law intended to create a national banking system that would 
mirror the U.S. National Currency Act of 1867,  whereby any banking organiza- 
tion with a required minimum level of capital could issue bond-secured notes. 
In the view of the government, 
Capital, both internal and foreign will find in this manner a sure investment, and will be 
attracted by the guarantee represented by the public funds purchased and by the security 
and stability possessed by any bank legislated for by the Nation and protected by the 
same before the Court.. ..  This system, in its fundamental form, has been employed with 
the most admirable success by the Government of the United States, the Constitution 
of which  country formed  the model of that of the Argentine Republic, though  the 
accompanying bill has certainly deviated from that system in many respects?’ 
In fact, this new monetary experiment was to fail because the bill deviated 
from the American one in two very fundamental and serious respects.  First, 
the American bond-secured  paper  notes were redeemable in gold, while in 
Argentina the specie standard was in suspension. Second, in the United States, 
eligible public bonds came from active secondary markets while in Argentina 
eligible  bonds were specially created for the purpose ofbacking new paper issues. 
At  best, the Argentine plan implied the creation of significant new public debt 
to support an ambitious financial development strategy. At worst, it established 
a highly leveraged government-backed Ponzi scheme disturbingly reminiscent 
of John Law’s infamous manipulations of the French economy that had led to 
the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles of the early eighteenth century. Or, if 
one admits multiple equilibria, it could have implied both!31 
To  summarize, the rules of this new game for banks issuing bond-secured 
notes worked in the following way.  Banks could issue paper money provided 
that they purchased National Gold Bonds to the full amount of the notes to 
be emitted. The bonds-this  is an important detail-were  to be paid for with 
bullion from the banks, and the bullion and the bonds were to be deposited 
in the Banco Nacional.  If the banks remained solvent, they were entitled to 
the interest payments on the bonds; in the case of bankruptcy, the government 
would sell the securities and reimburse creditors out of the proceeds?’ 
30. Proposal presented by the Executive Power to the Congress in September 1887 (Agote 1887, 
pp. 405-13). 
31. Garber (2000) forcefully points out that the common characterization of the Mississippi and 
South Sea phenomena as bubbles deserves careful scrutiny with respect to the timing of in- 
vestors’ changing perceptions in a situation of uncertainty and possibly asymmetric  information. 
In a similar vein, Duncan (1983) has stood up for the view that the Juarez Celman adminis- 
tration had a bold but feasible development strategy in mind that was not ex ante destined to 
be a bubble. While, ex post, the Baring Crisis proved to be a bubble that burst this particular 
plan, it is not clear that it was always destined to end so. 
32. A detailed explanation of the Law of National Guaranteed Banks appears in Appendix 2. Anchors Aweigh  59 
By December 1888, sixteen banks, mostly provincial and mixed banks, had 
invoked these rules to issue 39 million pesos in  guaranteed notes up to the ceiling 
prescribed by the law. Critically, they contracted foreign loans to purchase the 
guaranteed bonds with gold:’  Thus, in essence, the scheme was an arbitrage 
operation by which foreign investors were implicitly partners in the business of 
issuing paper money via a credit boom at the Argentine banks. 
Financial operations such as  these entailed all the kinds of dangerous as- 
set mismatches  now commonly associated with  such arbitrage in emerging 
markets-as  seen, for example, in the Asian Crisis of 1997. The foreign loans 
to the Argentine banks were liabilities in gold, but some of the domestic loans 
they funded were assets denominated in paper pesos, creating a currency mis- 
match that would make for a leveraged position that would be very vulnerable 
to devaluation. There was also the potential for a maturity mismatch: some of 
the domestic loans by banks funded long-term investment projects, and their 
terms would far exceed the shorter maturity of the foreign loans, leading to 
problems if the foreign creditors refused a rollover and the domestic loan was 
illiquid or insolvent. 
From the macroeconomic point ofview, the new scheme acted like a “one-way 
gold standard”: the issue of 39 million paper pesos was backed by a gold inflow 
of 33 million gold pesos. The rules of the game were more or less respected 
in that most new note issues were backed with a 100 percent marginal bullion 
reserve. But the scheme had its limits and these were soon encountered. From 
early 1889 foreign investors became reluctant to absorb additional Argentine 
government debt and, moreover, quite a few of them were dumping Argentine 
bonds in the London market.”4  It  seemed that Argentina had hit a debt ceiling, 
and the shift in market sentiment was  soon apparent.  In Buenos Aires, the 
public started a relentless attack on the “guaranteed” paper peso, depreciating 
its value relative to gold. 
Unnerved by the sliding exchange rate, and seeking to calm expectations 
of devaluation, the government decided to intervene in the foreign-exchange 
market. They employed the national gold stock (that is, the gold deposited in 
the Banco Nacional) to defend the value of the paper peso, thus setting the 
exchange rate on a “dirty float.” In March 1889, for example, 5 million gold 
pesos were spent in such a defense. Yet, like most such defenses, the enterprise 
proved futile and by December of that year defeat was near. The stock of gold 
33. These loans amounted to 47 million gold pesos; by  the end of 1888 the stock of bullion in 
guarantee of the notes sitting at the Banco Nacional amounted to 33 million gold pesos. See 
Williams (1920, p.  58) and Appendix 1. 
34. According to lndleberger (1984, pp. 258-59):  “Germans sold off Russian bonds to France, 
and even unloaded  Argentine bonds in London in 1888 and  1889.  Various  explanations 
had been given for dumping Argentine bonds: investors became uneasy about Argentina and 
enamored of gambling in industrial shares at home; or they were disturbed by instability in the 
Argentine exchange rate, at a time when British investors were slow to see its implications.” 60  Straining at  the Anchor 
remaining in the vaults of the Banco Nacional was valued at only 6 million paper 
pesos, but the still-outstanding emission of “guaranteed” notes amounted to 73 
million paper pesos. 
The futility of the “defense” is revealed more clearly once it is understood 
that the government elected to sterilize the effects of their own open-market 
intervention operations by rediscounting the bills initially absorbed, thus per- 
petuating the excess supply of paper notes. That is, the intervention made for 
no macroeconomic adjustment, merely a reserve outflow of gold from the gov- 
ernment’s coffers! It was, one might argue, a classic first-generation currency 
crisis waiting to happen.35 
One possible ex ante rationale for this policy was that, by rigging the gold 
market to try to maintain a flat gold premium, the government believed that 
it could signal to foreign investors that resumption at par was still a feasible 
outcome. As in second-generation models of currency crisis one could appeal 
to the notions of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling crises as a justification 
for the interventions.  We have already alluded to such possibilities. In a “bad 
equilibrium” the markets could have deemed Argentina “unworthy” and the 
resulting capital outflow and crash would validate the belief, and unworthy it 
would be?6 The government might have felt that a “bad equilibrium” could be 
avoided if steps were taken to bolster the belief of market participants.  The 
government likely assumed that with a steady foreign inflow of gold, any losses 
in the national gold stock would be easily replenished. 
This assumption proved false. Capital flows ebbed and by 1889 the govern- 
ment could not avoid using notes for fiscal purposes even without gold backing. 
Once the government began to sterilize the gold outflow in this fashion the 
inelastic link between the gold stock and the supply of notes by the Banco Na- 
cional was broken?’ Simply put, with this turn of events the rules of the game of 
the Law of National Guaranteed Banks were broken, and the Banco Nacional 
began acting out the all-too familiar role of a money-printer to the state?* De- 
spite attempts to prevent excessive depreciation during the ensuing “dirty  float,” 
Argentine macroeconomic and banlung policy was from that moment virtually 
rudderless and an eventual wreck was only to be expected. 
35. Krugman (1979). 
36. On  self-fulfilling crises see Obstfeld (1994; 1996) and Calvo (1996; 1998). 
37. The  government’s choice of policies, and the flight from the paper peso by the public, probably 
derived from a combination of unclear rules of the game plus a change in the fiscal scenario. 
For the sake of tractability, we postpone our account of the fiscal policies of the period until 
Chapter 4. 
38. In fact there were two sources of increase in unbacked paper notes:  the already-mentioned 
national government  issues, and similar issues from the provincial state-chartered  hanks of 
issue. These  latter received a special authorization to emit paper notes without depositing gold 
as collateral (Williams 1969, pp. 58-59). Anchors Aweigh  61 
Figure 2.4. Proximate Determinants of the Money Multiplier, 1884-1914 
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Notes and sources;  Currency-Money  Ratio is the ratio of currency in the hands of the public 
to the money stock.  Reserve-Deposit  Ratio is ratio of banks’ cash reserves to deposits.  See 
Appendix 1. 
A Longer Run Statistical Perspective 
A statistical view of monetary expansion in the period throws some of these 
developments into sharper relief.  We consider here the accounting shown in 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4,  and the time series data shown in Figures 2.4  through 2.5. 
(A detailed explanation of these statistics can be found in Appendix 3.) Several 
features warrant discussion. 
First, we note that  there was a dramatic change in the portfolio composition of 
the issuing banks. There was an inverse association between monetary specie 
and paper (Table 2.4,  part E). Banks expanded their paper liabilities, which 
were nominally backed with public bonds, but there was no bullion backing the 
National Gold Bonds. 
Second, bank-created money, aproxy for private sector credit to the real sector, 
increased by 80 percent in the period 1887-89 reflecting in part the multiplier 
effect of a sustained entry of new institutions into the banking sy~tem.3~ 
Third, a falling reserve-ratio accounted for 35 percent of the growth in the 
39. The increase in bank credit resulted in an economic boom of considerable proportions. The 
nominal value of the declared capital of new companies registered in the Public Commercial 
Register grew as follows (in millions ofpaper pesos): 1882-83,19; 1884-85,24;  188647,129; 
and 188849,574  (Williams 1920, p.  72). 62  Straining at  the Anchor 
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Notes andsourres:  Units are as a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP).  See Appendix 1. 
money stock. A possible explanation is one aspect of banking regulation that 
allowed already established banks of issue to “dispose of half the specie reserve 
provided by the law in order to purchase public funds.”40 
Finally, the level of specie hoarding by the public as  a percentage of the 
monetary base quickly rose from a steady level of 5 percent to 15 percent in 
1888. Especially striking is the acute reallocation of specie to the public from 
the banking system in 1888-91. 
The  public demand for gold was financed by the banking sector, in particular 
by the banks of issue.  They provided specie in order to defend their notes 
against expectations of devaluation, but this could not go on forever. The  “dirty 
float” abruptly ceased once the banks’ specie stock was depleted in 1890. By 
1891, the year of the financial crash, public holdings of specie amounted to 
90 percent  of the entire stock in the country, while at the beginning of the 
monetary experiment they had represented only 15 percent.  For rest of the 
century confidence in the banking system was not restored, and roughly the 
same relative shares were maintained. 
Looking ahead for a moment, how did Argentina recover from this dramatic 
shift in the use of specie? Did the public’s lack of faith in the banking system 
40. See Articles 26 and 27 of the proposed law in Agote (1887, pp. 421-22) Anchors Aweigh  63 
and paper money persist?  We can examine the evolution of specie holdings 
during the gold-exchange standard regime after 1899, and the pattern shown 
in Figure 2.5 is clear. Public holdings of specie lost relative importance, a result 
one expects to see after the creation of credible convertibility under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. It is also reasonable to conclude that it took some time 
for confidence in paper money to redevelop, since during the first three years of 
the new regime gold reserves for backing the monetary base were nil. 
In  what follows,  we will apply an economic model to the behavior of the public 
in a more general framework. For now, the evidence from the crisis on specie 
holdings suggests that people were not always convinced that paper money was 
as good as gold, with important implications when we analyze the demand for 
real cash balances.  But before we get ahead of ourselves, the question of the 
moment that we must consider next is how the late 1880s currency crisis spread 
into a real, full-scale financial collapse. In the next chapter we therefore turn 
to the analysis of the Baring Crisis. This Page Intentionally Left Blank